McNAGHTEN'S CASE AND BEYOND.
No judicial expression has, perhaps, so vitally influenced
the administration of the criminal law as the opinion delivered by the English judges in the House of Lords, on
June 19, 1843, usually reported as McNaghten's Case., It
has been rigorously followed since in England, being copied
verbatim in many English and American text-books, and
has crystallized the doctrine of insanity as a defence in
criminal, trials in a majority of the jurisdictions in the
United States.
In this so-called case, five questions were propounded to
the judges, the answers to which, it was thought, would be
a thorough exposition of the law of England concerning
insanity as a defence to prosecutions for crime.
It is the purpose of this article to discuss only two of
these questions, with the answers thereto,. viz: those usually
cited as authority for the doctrine that in criminal trials,
where insanity is the defence, the burden is on the defendant
to prove insanity, and if the jury, after hearing all the
evidence, are in doubt on this qlestion, they must convict
the prisoner.
The history of this opinion is a peculiar one, and the circumstances under which it was delivered were well calculated to impress the public mind of England, for which purpose, indeed, it was intended. But it is difficult to understand the influence it has exerted on the Bench and Bar for
so many years.
McNaghten, having causelessly killed a most estimable
gentleman in the streets of London in the open, day, was
-triod for murder before Chief Justice Tindall and Justices
Williams and Coleridge, -and acquitted on the ground of
insanity. Public indignation was greatly aroused.; the
British and Foreign Medical Review stated that the verdict
"has completely overturned the old doctrine of implied
io CI. & F. 2oo.
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malice in-law ;" Sir V. Blake moved- for leave to bring in a
bill in the House of Commons to abolish the plea of insanity
in cases of murder, or attempts to murder, except when it
could be proved that the accused was publicly reputed to be
a maniac ;2 and the case finally became the subject of debate
in the House of Lords,3 and a change in the existing law was
there agitated. The Lord Chancellor reviewed in the debate the common law, demonstrated that only those who
were hopelessly insane were excused under that law, and
opposed any change-the only one thought of being a
change to a more rigorous accountability.
Lord Brougham thought the public, especially the criminal
public, were becoming imbued -with the heretical doctrine
advanced by certain eminent physicians, that all men were
more or less insane; and that as some judges had made the
test of insanity "the capacity to know right from wrong,'"
others "the capacity to know good from evil," others "the
knowing what was proper" and others, "what was wicked,"
it would tend to uniformity to have an authoritative opinion
on the existing law; he also objected to the course of Tindall, C. J., in virtually taking the case .from the jury.
Lord Cottenham also thought it would tend to uniformity,
to have an opinion from the judges.
Lord Campbell feared that Tindall, C. J., in taking the
case from the jury after hearing the testimony of experts,
had created "the impression on the public mind that if a certain number of medical witnesses, generally called mad
doctors, had come into court and said that in their opinion
the prisoner was insane when he committed the act, the trial
was to be stopped, cadit questio/' hat "the public mind was
in considerable alarm on this subject. The public had been
inundated by medical books calculated very much to mislead juries in case of future trials."
It was finally agreed to call on the judges to appear in
the House and answer certain questions concerning the existing law on this important subject.- Two precedents were
found for this course,. and -on June 19 the judges- appeared.
'1Hansard's Debates, Vol. LXVII, p. 4-4.
*IHansard, Vol. LXVII, pp. 288, 714.
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-The judges gave their answers most reluctantly, Maue, J.
saying:
"I feel great difficulty in answering the questions put by
your lordships on this occasion. First, because they do not
appear to arise, out of and are not put with reference to a
particular case, or for a particular purpose, which might
explain or limit the generality of their terms, so that full
answers to them ought to be applicable to every possible
state of facts, not inconsistent with those assumed ir- the
questions; this difficulty is the greater, from the practical
experience both of the bar and court being confined to questions arising out of the facts of-particular cases. Secondly,
because I have heard no argument at your Lordships' bar
or elsewhere,4 on the subject of these questions; the want 6f
which I feel the more, the greater are the number and extent
of questions which might be raised in argumtiit; and thirdly,
from a fear, of which I cannot divest myself, that as thes
questions relate to matters of criminal laws of great imp6rtance and frequent occurrence, the answers to them by the
judges may embarrass the administration of justice, wheh
they are cited in criminal trials. For these reasons I should
have been glad if my learned brethren would have joined me
in praying your Lordships to excuse us from answering these
questions; but as I do not think they ought to induce me t6
ask that indulgence for myself individually, I shall proceed
to give such answers as I can, after a very short time which
I have had to consider these questions, and under the difficulties I have mentioned; fearing that my answers may be
as little satisfactory to others as they are to myself."
Lord Chief Justice Tindall speaking for the other judges,
.
think it right, in the
says: "Her Majesty's judges .
first place, to state that they have forborne entering into
any particular discussion upon these questions, from the extreme and almost insuperable difficulty of applying those
inswers to cases in which the facts are not brought judicially
before them. The facts of each particular case must of necessity present themselves with endless variety, and with every
'Italics mine.
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it is their duty

to declare the law upon each particular case On facts proved
before them, and after hearing argument of counsel thereon," etc. Thus it appears that not only were the judges
averse to giving an opinion on so important and difficult a
subject (a subject that the Lord Chancellor admitted in the
debate was little understood), with so little time for study,
and without the help of counsel, but also that they felt that
the opinion when given would be of little value. In this,
however, they builded stronger, if not better, than they knew.
So much then for the estimate of the judges themselves
on the general opinion they were about to deliver. How
does the case stand as to the value of that part of the
opinion that has been accepted as authority for the rule as
to the burden of proof ?
, While the judges lament the lack of time for preparation
and the absence of argument of counsel, it is reasonable to
suppose that they had read the debate that was the immediate
cause of the call for their opinion, and that what study they
had given to the subject had been devoted to those parts of
it which the debate showed were regarded by the Lords as
important and doubtful. An examination of this debate
shows that the only questions agitating the minds of the
public and the Lords were (i) the test of insanity, i. e., the
kind and degree of insanity that would excuse its victim
from punishment for an act which if done by a sane person
would bring upon him the sanction of the law; (2) the
right of the trial judge to usurp the functions of the jury;
(3) the legality of allowing experts not previously acquainted with the accused to testify as to their opinion of
his sanity. No word was said in the debate even
remotely bearing on the question of the burden of proof.
When the judges appeared, however, in addition to the questions concerning these points, the following were submitted:
"2d. What are the proper questions to be submitted to
the jury when a person bleged to be inflicted with insane
delusion respecting one or more particular subjects or persons, is charged with the commission of a crime (murder,
for example), and insanity is set up as a defence?"

"3d. In what terms ought the question to be left to the
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jury, as to the prisoner's state of mind at the time when the
act was committed?"
Just what was intended by these two questions it would
be difficult to say, and after reading them one sympathizes
with Justice Maule in his desire to hear counsel.
That the judges themselves did not see the drift of them
appears by a comparison of the answer given to them by
Justice Maule and the other judges.
Maule, J. answers as follows:
"Second, the questions necessarily to be submitted to the
jury, are those questions of fact which are raised in the
record. In a criminal trial, the question commonly is,
.whether the accused be guilty or not guilty; but, in order to
assist the jury-in coming to a right conclusion on this neces,
sary and ultimate question, it is usual and proper to submit
such subordinate or intermediate questions, as the course
which the trial has taken may have made it convenient to
direct their attention to. What those questions are, 'and
the manner of submitting them, is a matter of discretion
for the judge; a discretion to be guided by a consideration of
all the circumstances attending the inquiry. In performing
this duty, it is sometimes necessary or convenient to inform
the jury as to the law; and if, in a trial such as is suggested
in the question, he should have occasion to state what kind
and degree5 of insanity would amount to a defence, it should
be stated conformably to what I have mentioned in my
answer to the first question, as being in my opinion, the law
on this subject."- The learned judge had stated in his
answer to the first question that the kind and degree of insanity that would excuse must be an unsoundness of mind
that rendered the prisoner incapable of knowing right from
wrong.
"Third, there are no terms which the jfidge is by law re- quired to use. They should not be inconsistent with the
law as above stated, but should be such as, in the discretion
of the judge are proper to assist the jury in coming to a
right conclusion as to the guilt of the accused."
It is perfectly clear from these answers that the questions
"Italics mine.
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did not suggest to the mind of the learned judge any proposition involving the burden of proof. The first question submitted was directed to the test of insanity in cases of delusion, and Justice Maule's answer to that question is entirely responsive; his answer to the second, says, in effect,
that if he felt called on to instruct the jury as to the law he
should instruct them in the terms of his answer to the first
question; his answer to the third repeats this, and adds,
"there are no terms which the judge is by law required to
use."
The other judges, speaking through Tindall, C. J., though
they respond categorically to the other three questions submitted, viz: the first, fourth 'and fifth, involving the test of
insanity and the question of expert evidence, think "these
two questions .... ...
more conveniently answered together" and submit their opinions to be "that the jurors
ought to be told in all cases that every man is prestimed to
be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be
responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to
their satisfaction; and that to establish a defence on the
ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the
time of the committing of the act, the party accused was
laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the.
mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he
was doing; or if he did know it, he did not know he was
doing what was wrong. The mode of putting the latter
part of the question to the jury on these occasions has generally been whether the accused at the time of the act knew
the difference between right and wrong," etc.
In this statement the judges have really answered only
the third question, "In what terms ought the question to be
left to the jury, as to the prisoner's state of mind at the
time when the act was committed ?" Instead of an answer
to the second question, "What are the proper questions to
be submitted to the jury," in which Maule, J. sees a query
as to kind and degree of insanity, they reply, "The jurors
ought to be told that every man is presumed to be sane," etc.,
which does not submit any question to the jury, but "rather
gives binding instructions that may take from them the
question of questions, viz: has the prosecution proved one
of the essential elements in the crime, the evil intent..
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This part of their answer would, if this proceeding had
been an ordinary hearing on appeal, be called dictum.
*It should be added that in this solemn pronouncement of
the law of England on a most important branch of the
criminal law, the majority of the judges do not cite a single
precedent, and the only case cited by Maule, J. is the very
case (MeNaghten's) that gave rise to the proceedings.
Yet it is this dictum, in an opinion rendered without the
benefit of previous argument by counsel; with little time
for preparation; and in a proceeding contrary to the whole
spirit. of the common law, whose expositors have always
repudiated with fine scorn the responsa prudentum of -the
Roman law, which this so closely resembles; prophetically
protested against by the judges themselves as likely to embarrass the administration of justice; and under the fear of
one that the answers might be as little satisfactory to others.
as they were to himself; with the citation of a single authority, and that a discredited one, that is cited-by the English
judges and the majority of the courts in the United States
to-day as authority for the proposition that at common law
the burden of proving insanity is on the defendant.
It is to be noted that this is not a case of first impression
or a case arising under a statute where by judicial construction new law is made by the judges. Here the question was,
shall there be legislative action on the law of insanity, and
in order to decide that question the judges are asked what
is the existing law of the subject. The answers of the judges
therefore were authoritative only in so far as they declare•
the existing law as gathered from previous decisions.
-What then was the law on thig subject as understood by
the Bench and Bar of England previous to McNaghten's
Case? One of the earliest criminal cases reported at length
involving the question of insanity is Arfiold's Case,0 tried
in 1724. Arnold was indicted for a felony in wounding
L.ord Onslow. The fact of the wounding was admitted, and
the prisoner set up insanity as a defence. Much evidence
was produced on both sides touching the prisoner's State of
mind. Justice Tracy, after rehearsingthe evidence, charged
the jury as follows:
i6 How. St. Tr. 695.
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"That he shot, and that willfully, is proved; but whether
maliciously, that is the thing; that is the question; whether
this man hath the use of his reason and sense? If-he was
under the visitation of God, and could not distinguish between good and evil, and did not know what he did, though
he committed the greatest offence, yet he could not be guilty
of any offence against any law whatsoever; for guilt arises
from the mind, and the wicked will and intention of the man.
If a man be deprived of his reason, and consequently of his
intention, he cannot be guilty.

.

This is on one

.

side. On the other side we must be very cautious; it is not
every frantic and idle humor of a man that will exempt him
from justice, and the punishment of the law. When a man
is guilty-of a great offence, it must be very plain and clear,
before a man is allowed such an exemption; therefore, it is
not every kind of frantic humor or something unaccountable
in a man's actions, that points him out to be such a madman
as is to be exempted from punishment; it must be a man that
is totally deprived of his understanding and memory, and
doth not know what he is doing, no more than an infant,
than a brute, or a wild beast, such a one is never the object
of punishment; therefore, I must leave it to your consideration, whether the condition this man was in, as it is repre,
sented to you on one side or on the other, doth show a man
who knew what he was doing, and was able to distinguish
whether he was doing good or evil,

.

.

.

and if you

believe he was sensible, and had the use of his reason, and
understood what he did, then he is not within the exemptions
of the law, but is as subject to punishment as any other person. Gentlemen, I must leave it to you."
There are several things to be noted in this charge. The
first is the recognition of the principle, sometimes overlooked
by judges, involved in the defence of insanity.
"If a man be deprived of his reason, and consequently of
his intention, he cannot be guilty," says Justice Tracy. Every
element that goes to make up the crime must be proven by
the prosecution; intention is.one of these elements and, unless
the jury are satisfied by the prosecution beyond a reasonable
doubt that the prisoner was sane, one of the elements, of
guilt is not made out. The charge is severe against the
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prisoner, "he must be totally deprived of his understanding"
and "not know what he is doing, more than an infant, than
a brute, or a wild beast," yet severe as it is it does not instruct
the jury that to establish the defence "it must be clearly
proved" by the prisoner that he was insane. There is a
sentence that at first sight appears to say this, but on closer
inspection it in fact says something very different. Says
the"On
court:
the other side, we must be very cautious;
it is not
every frantic and idle humor of a man, that will exempt
him from justice, and the punishment of the law.- When a
man is guilty of a great offence, it must be very plain and
.clear, before a man is allowed such an exemption; therefore,
it is not every kind of frantic humor or something unaccountable in a man's actions that points him out to be such
7
a madman as is exempt' from punishment."
The court is here speaking not of the burden of proof, but
of the test of insanity; not of who must prove sanity or insanity, but of the extent of the insanity that deprives a man
of intent and will; it is not that the proof must be clear; but
that the insanity must be clear and plain insanity and not a
mere "something unaccountable in his actions."
The
prisoner might give the clearest proof of a "frantic and idle
humor" but that would not excuse him; but suppose he gave
less evidence than would "clearly prove" such clear and .
plain insanity as the court is speaking of, yet enough to raise
a reasonable doubt of his sanity, what then should be the
verdict of the jury? This'is the question of the burden of
proof, and the judges in McNaghten's Case say the jury
should convict. The court in Arnold's Case does not answer
the question directly, but does answer it indirectly in the
light of the well-known rules of the criminal law, that the
prosecution must prove the full crime beyond a reasonable
doubt, by saying that "if a man be deprived of his reason
and consequently of his intention, he cannot be guilty."
The court further answers the question in saying, "I must
leave it to your consideration, whether the condition this
man was in, as it is represented to you on the one side or
the other, doth show a man who knew what he was doing."
'Italics mine.
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That the court in the use of the words "clear and plain"
is speaking. of the extent of insanity only, is further shown
by the word "therefore," connecting the two parts of the
sentence, and the word "such," qualifying madman. "It
must be very clear and plain, . . . therefore it is not
every kind of frantic and idle humor . . . that points
him out to be such a madman."
It is significant that in Hadfield's Case, infra,8 the Solicitor General speaking for the prosecution quotes this charge
almost verbatim, but omits the Words "it must be very clear
and plain," thinking,' probably, that they rather detracted
from the force of the statement of the law for which ht
was quoting'Tracy, J., that the insanity must be a iotal
insanity.
"A more important case, in view of the tribunal before
vhich it was tried, was that of Earl Ferrers,9 who was in,
dicted for murder, in 176o, before the Hou'e of Lords, "a
set of judges," he was reminded by the Lord High Steward,
"'whose sagacity and penetration no material circumstances
ih evidence can escape, and whose justice nothing can influtence or avert."
. Mr. Perrot, afterward a baron of the Exchequer; Mr.
-Yorke, Solicitor General, and the Attorney General, afterward Lord Camden, C. J. of the Common Pleas and Lofd
.Chancellor, conducted the prosecution.
There was, of course, no charge in this case, the Lords
simply voting guilty or not guilty, but the address of the
Solicitor General states the law on the subject of insanity,
that being the defence, the killing being admitted by the
prisoner.
In this address the Solicitor General clearly recognizes
and accepts the burden of proving the prisoner's sanity as
necessary to the proof of his guilt. He says :10
"My Lords, it is certainly true, that the fact is not murder
without malice, . . . and malice must depend in every
case upon the will and understanding of the party." Pages
of argument could add nothing to this clear statement of
'P. 276.

'ig How. St. Tr. 885.

Col. 946.
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the law, and the inference from it. The prosecution must
prove the fact, and that it was done with malice, malice must
depend upon the understanding; the prisoner claims he had
no understanding, hence no malice; the prosecution must
prove the understanding as a pre-requisite to the proof of
malice.
Having laid down the general principle, he proceeds to
show to the Lords that the prosecution has proved malice,
summing up, "This is the substance of the evidence, which
has been offered for the King; and it not only proves the
fact, but proves it to be murder. My Lords, what is the
evidence, produced by the noble- lord to weaken the force of
it?"

Here again we see the plaintiff and defendant in their
proper positions, the prosecution proving, the defence weakening, the force of the evidence. In closing he still more
clearly shows his recognition of the principle that the defence of insanity is only a denial of malice or intent, and
does not shift the burden of proof. "The counsel who attend
your Lordships for the King," he says, "chose to. submit it
to your opinions, whether the evidence produced for the
prisoner does not tend to strengthen, rather than weaken,
that proof of capacity, which arises out of all the circumstances urged in support of the charge."
It was said by the Solicitor General in Rex. v. Hadfield,
1n'in commenting on this
infra,
address, "To the law thus
laid down upon that trial, all the judicial authorities in the
kingdom must be deemed to have given their assent; the
judges sitting there as assistants of the House, heard the
law thus laid down; and if such was not the law, it was their
duty to have declared the contrary."
12
The next important case was that of Rex v. Kinloch,

tried in 1795, in the High Court of Justiciary at Edinburgh,
and conducted by eminent judges and counsel. The
-killing by the prisoner, Sir Gordon Kinloch, of his brotherGerman, Sir Francis Kinloch, was an admitted fact in the
case and the only question at issue was the sanity or insanity
of the prisoner.
u P. 276.
1

25 How. St. Tr. 89!.
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Here again if we study the charge of the court carefully
we fail to find any authority for the answers of the judges
to the third and fourth questions in McNaghten's Case,
though there are expressions which at first sight seem to
be in line with those answers. The court says: "It will
occur to any man of sense and judgment, that there are
different degrees of insanity. If a man is totally and permanently mad, that man cannot be guilty of a crime.
The next insanity that is mentioned in our law books is one
that is total, but temporary. When such a man commits a
crime, he is liable to trial; but, when he pleads insanity, it
will be incumbent on him to prove that the deed was committed at a time when he was actually insane. There is still
another sort of distemper of mind, a partial insanity, which
only relates to particular subjects or notions; such a person
will talk and act like a madman upon those matters; but
still if he has as much reason as enables him to distinguish
between right and wrong, he must suffer that punishment
which the law inflicts on the crime he has committed."
The words of the court "it will be incumbent on him
to
prove that the deed was committed at a time when he was
actually insane," if wrenched from the context would seem
to place the burden of proving insanity on the prisoner ; but
here the court is instructing the jury on the kinds of insanity, as in Arnold's Case, supra, it was speaking of the
test of insanity. The court is making it clear to the jury
that when the defence is total but temporary insanity, the
act must have been done while the prisoner was under the
duress of the disease in order to render him innocuous to
punishment and not during a lucid interval.
The question of the burden of proof is approached further
on in the charge, and there we find no such binding instructions as say the judges in Mclaghten'sCase should be given.
Says the court: "Gentlemen, you will consider the evidence
and decide according to your consciences. If you are convinced that he knew 'right from wrong, you will return a
verdict of guilty. On the other hand, if it shall, appear to
you that he was not able to distinguish between moral good
and evil, you are bound to acquit him." In this charge if
the court were astute in the choice of words, it would seem
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that they rather placed the burden on the prosecution; if the
jury are "convinced," they are to find the prisoner guilty,
"if it shall appear" they are to acquit. By no reading can
it be an authority for the position of the judges in McNaghten's Case.
This case afforded an excellent opportunity for the contention that the burden of proof was on the prisoner because of the presumption of sanity, for- a great portion of
the evidence was directed to the state of mind of the defendant irevious to the killing; and the effect of that evidence as bearing on his sanity at the time of the killing was
dwelt on at length by counsel on both sides; yet though the
counsel for the prosecution argues zealously for a conviction, we find nothing in his address to the jury of presumptions of sanity or of the doctrine erroneously supposed to
flow therefrom. We do indeed find him speaking of the
prisoner "establishing the defence," and of whether "the
evidence adduced is sufficient to warrant the conclusion"
that he was insane, yet in summing up his address, having
just *told the jury that the killing being admitted, the only
-question before them was the issue of insanity, he says:
"Should the result (of the evidence) be to balance the
whole nearly equally in your minds, God forbid that, when
the life of a fellow-creature is concerned, I should attempt
to persuade you, were the attempt likely to succeed, that the
scale should not be inclined to the side of mercy."
A clear recognition and that by a zealous prosecution,
that the 'burden of 'proving sanity lies on the state, and that
if the jury are in doubt on the question they must acquit.
Five years later, in I8oO, we have the celebrated trial of
James Hadfield 1" for high treason, in attempting to murder
the King. This case was tried before the Court of King's
Bench, Lord Kenyon, C. J. and Grose, Lawrence and Le
Blanc, J. J. presiding. Perhaps no case has ever been con"ducted by more emirnent counsel. For the Crown appeared
the Attorney General, Sir John Mitford, afterwards Lord
Redesdale; the Solicitor General, Sir Win. Grant, .afterwards Master of the Rolls; Mr. Law, afterwards Lord
U27 How. St. Jr. 1281.
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Ellenborough and Chief Justice of the King's Bench;
Mr. Garrow and Mr. Wood, afterwards Barons of the Exichequer; and Mr. Abbott, afterwards Chief Justice of the
King's Bench. The Hon. Thomas Erskine, afterwards Lord
Chancellor, Mr. Sergeant Best, afterwards Judge of the
King's Bench, Mr. Knapp and Mr. Humphries appeared for
the prisoner.
During the trial, in which the shooting was proven, and
much evidence of insanity introduced, the Solicitor General
clearly accepted the burden of proving sanity, in such expressions as, "If he possessed that degree of sense which
enabled him to judge whether the act he was committing
was right or wrong, that has constantly been held sufficient
-to induce'a jury to find infants of tender years guilty of
,offences," and in reviewing Arnold's Case, "That he had
tL-steady and resolute design, and used all proper means to
effect it; that was considered by the counsel who opened the
case to the jury, as that which it was necessary to show, in
-orderto demonstrate that this man (whatever might be at
times the state of his mind) at the time when he did this act
14
had so far the possession of his mind," etc.
. - Again in quoting Tracy, J. in the same case, "I must
-leave it to your consideration whether the condition this
man was in, as it is represented to you on the one side and the
other, doth show a man who knew what he was doing."
At the close of the trial and after a masterly address by
Mr. Erskine, in which he analyzed the various kinds of insanity and the law applicable thereto, Lord Kenyon said:
':Mr. Attorney General, can you call any witnesses to contradict'these facts (facts testified to.as evidence of insanity) ?
With regard to the law, as -it has been laid down, there can
be no doubt upon earth; to be sure, if a man is in a deranged
-state of mind at the time, he is not criminally answerable for
his acts; but the material part of this case is, whether at the
very time when the act was committed this man's mind was
sane. I confess, the facts proved by the witnesses (though
some of them stand in near relationship to the prisoner, yet
others do not) bring home conviction to one's mind, that
" Italics mine..
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at the tinie he committed this offence, and a most horrid
one it is, he was in a very deranged state. I do- not know
that one can run the case very nicely; if you do run it very
nicely, to be sure it is an acquittal. His sanity must be made
out to the satisfactionof a moral man, meeting the case with
fortitude of mind, knowing he has an arduous duty to discharge, yet if the scales hang anything like even, throwing in
a certain proportion of mercy to the party."' 15
Certainly there are no variations from the normal here
that in forty-five years, by natural selection, or otherwise,
could have evolved the thing we find the judges presenting
to the House of Lords in i843. - We must conclude it was a
special creation.
. In the next !case, Rex v. Bellingham," the prisoner was
tried for the murder of the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
There was no doubt of the killing by the prisoner, indeed
he admitted it, claiming he had done the act because the diteased had refused to redress a grievance of the prisoner.
He refused to plead insanity, but this defence was interposed
by his counsel. The Attorney General and the court both
recognized the principle that the plea of insanity was merely
a denial of malice or intent, the former saying: "I know very
well the principle upon which insanity is received as a defefnce; I know that the man to whom I should impute insanity, must be one that is incapable of malice;" the court
adding, "such a man could have no intention at all." The
court in its charge, however, goes even further than the
judges ini
their answers in McNaghten's Case. Collinson reports Mansfield, J. saying:
"In order to support this defence (insanity), however, it
ought to be proved by the most distinct and unquestioned
evidence, that the criminal was incapable of judging between right and wrong. It must in fact be proved beyond
all doubt, that at the time he committed this atrocious act
he did not consider that murder was a crime against
Italics mine.
"Tried in Old Bailey in May, 1812, before Mansfield, C. J., Grose,
J., and Graham, B. It does not appear to ha-e been reported in any
of the regular reports, but may be found as an addendum to Collinson's

Law of Lunatics.
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the laws of God and nature. There is no other proof of insanity that will excuse murder or any other crime."
- If this charge had ended here it would have been a precedent, not indeed for the rule announced by the Judges in
McNaghten's Case that insanity "must be dearly proved,"
nor even for the harsher rule abandoned by all but a few
jurisdictions, that the prisoner must prove insanity "beyond
a reasonable doubt," but for the rule that he must prove it
'beyond all doubt," a rule never promulgated by any judge,
before or since.
- The report of this charge, however, continues: "His lordship concluded by exhorting the jury to take the facts into
their most serious consideration; if they entertained any
doubt, they would give the prisoner the benefit of it; but
if they believed him-guilty, they would find him so." Now
as -the prisoner aiid .his counsel admitted the Iilling, and as
theeourt had-instructed the jury that the defence of redressing the supposed grievance was not a legal defence, nothing
remained about which the jury could entertain a doubt except the insanity of the prisoner. Unless we believe that
Lord Mansfield in one breath told the jury to convict the
prisoner unless he proved beyond all doubt his insanity, and
in the next to acquit him if there was a doubt of his sanity,
we must come to the conclusion that the charge is incorrectly reported; and that this is the true solution of the difficulty appears from the debate in the House of Lords concerning McNaghten's Case, when the Lord Chancellor, reading from the shorthand notes of Bellingham's Case, quotes
Lord Mansfield as saying to the jury: "The question is this,
whether yo u are satisfied that he (.the prisoner) had a suffident degree of capacity to distinguish between good and evil,
and to know that he was committing a crime when he cornmitted the act; in that case you will find him guilty.". This
announces a very different proposition of law, and one that
is entirely in line with the previous authorities reviewed.
In Bowlers Case,17 tried at Old Bailey a few months
later, Le Blanc, J. charged the jury in practically the same
language as that just quoted from the Lord Chancellor.
"Collin.

Lun. Add.
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It is not until 1831, only twelve years before McNaghten's
Case, that we find the doctrine that has governed the courtsfor more than a century infringed upon, and then by a single
judge in a case tried in circuit, Rex v. Oxford.'8 The report
of this case reads: "Lord Lyndhurst, C. B. (in summifg
up), told the jury that they must be satisfied, before they
could acquit the prisoner on the ground of insanity, that he
did not know. . .
His lordship referred to the doctrine laid down in Bellingham's Case by Sir James Mansfield,
and expressed his complete accordance in the observations of
that learned judge."
We have seen that this learnid judge laid down no such
doctrine in Bellingham's Case; but it is not difficult from
what has been previously said on that case, to understand
how. Lord Lyndhurst was misled, especially if, as is not
improbable, the case not being found in any of the regular
reports, he read "thereport of it given in Russell on Crimes,
the standard English authority, where that poition of the
charge of Lord Mansfield which instructs the jury that if
they entertained any doubt they would give the prisoner the
benefit of it, is omitted. This case, therefore, founded as it
is on a misconception of the doctrine laid down in another
case, and tried by a single judge on circuit, may be dismissed
from
consideration
authority.
In Reg.
v. Tyler as
and Prince," tried seven years later, and
five years before McNaghten's Case, we get back to the normal rule. In this case Denman, C. J. charged the jury: "In
order to inake out that part of the charge which imputes to
Thom the act of murder, and that these persons were guilty
of aiding and abetting him to commit the murder, it would
be necessary to show that Thorn was a person capable of committing that murder. In order to make out the malicious
intention imputed in the verdict to the act of Thom he must

be shown to have been of sound mind20 at the time when he

committed it; for it is a maxim of law that persons not of
sound mind cannot be held responsible for their acts."
The last case before McNaghten's, involving this question,
S5 Car. & P. x68.
"8 Car. & P. 616.
Italics mine.
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is Reg. v. Oxford.2 1 Oxford was tried in the Central Criminal Court in 184o for high treason in shooting at the Queen.
Denman, C; J. delivered the charge to the jury, and if his
remarks as reported in Carrington and Payne are given correfly, this case would afford the first authority for the rule
announced in McNaghten's Case. In this report the judge
is quoted as saying: "Persons prima facie must be taken
to be of sound mind till the contrary is shown," which of
course is in itself a correct statement of a presumption, and
later says, "upon the whole the question will be, whether
all that has been proved about the prisoner at the bar shows
that he was insane

.

.

.

whether the evidence given

proves a disease of the mind,". Again, "The question is,
whether the prisoner was laboring under that species of
insanity which satisfies you that he was quite unaware of
the nature

.

.

.

of the act he was committing."

The charge nowhere instructs the jury. that if they have a
reasonable doubt of the prisoner's sanity they must convict
him, as do the charges in cases subsequent to McNaghten's
Case, but, taken as a whole, the charge as thus reported
would justify such a conclusion. In the much more extended report of this case given in the State Trials, however, while the reporter adopts language similar to this in
his head note, and reports in the same words the remarks
of the judge as to the presumption of sanity, instead of the
language requiring the jury to be satisfied of the prisoner's
sanity, thus throwing the burden. of proof on him, the court
is reported as saying, "if you think he was so unconscious
at the time, then undofibtedly you will be bound to say that
he was insane and not responsible.'" To show that this was
no chance disagreement of the reporters, the report in the
State Trials has a note immediately after the sentence just
quoted giving the language in Carrington and Payne's
report.
When it is. considered that Denman, C. J. was the same
judge who two years before in Reg. v. Tyler, supra,2" so
unqualifiedly laid down the rule that the prisoner "must

=4 St. Tr., N. S. 497; 9 Car. & P. 525.
" P. 280.
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*be showA to have been of sound mind," there can be little
doubt as to which report is the more correct.
That McNaghten's Case, in laying down the rule that
the burden of proving insanity is on the prisoner, is erroneous in principle has been clearly shown by Professor.Thayer, 23 Harlan, 3.24 and Cooley, C. J.25 That it finds no
support in precedent a study of the adjudged cases for a
century and a quarter previous would seem to demonstrate,
William E. Mikell.

"Thayer, Ev. 382.
"Davis v. U. S., x6o U. S. 46.
'People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9.

